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INTRODUCTION
The Wildlife Conservation Society
(WCS) operates five parks in New York
City, including the zoos at Central Park,
Queens, and Prospect Park, the New York
Aquarium and the Bronx Zoo. In addition,
WCS manages some 400 conservation
projects in 60 countries around the world.
The commitment to the well-being of ani-
mals in zoos and to the conservation of
critical landscapes around the globe pro-
vides a unique and robust set of competen-
cies to provide critical health care pro-
grams that work to ensure the health of
people, domestic animals, and wildlife.
This was clearly demonstrated in 1999,
when veterinary pathologists of the WCS
were the first to connect the deaths of peo-
ple, wild free-ranging birds, and zoo birds
to a new disease to the Western
Hemisphere. With samples from the WCS
wildlife health surveillance program, the
disease was confirmed to be West Nile
virus.
The Field Veterinary Program (FVP)
of the Wildlife Health Sciences Unit of
WCS is active on four continents and per-
forms community-based wildlife popula-
tion health monitoring and surveillance.
This on-the-ground commitment to assess-
ing the long-term health of wild popula-
tions provides critical information that can
serve as an early warning system for the
emergence of new and renewed pathogens
at the rural wildlife interface as well as the
regional urban marketplace. It has been
WCS FVP teams that provided the obser-
vations and samples that confirmed that
gorillas were dying of Ebola virus in cen-
tral and west Africa. During recent years,
the broad disease surveillance techniques
of the FVP have provided a baseline of
information on the health of mammals,
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SYMPOSIUM
Emerging Diseases at the Interface of People,
Domestic Animals, and Wildlife. The Role of




This article is based on an earlier publication in Foreign Affairs [1] and reprinted here
with permission. It has been updated with an introduction for avian influenza pandemic
preparedness.birds, and reptiles in various parts of the
world.
Low pathogen avian influenza (LPAI)
is endemic in wild migratory waterfowl
populations. Best theories suggest that
LPAI H5N1 moved from wild birds to
domestic fowl, and in 1997, highly patho-
genic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 was
first identified as a disease of domestic
fowl that spread to people in close contact
with them in Hong Kong. The resurgence
of this disease in Southeast Asia in 2004
brought a new wave of poultry and human
deaths. One must study the cultural and
agricultural practices inAsia to understand
how this disease might mutate to a highly
pathogenic form in domestic fowl, how it
might spread to humans, and how it might
jump back to wild migratory waterfowl.
Religious practices, such as merit bird
releases, bring people and passerine birds
into intimate contact. The popular prac-
tice of cockfighting results in people mov-
ing these birds across vast regions and car-
ing for injured cocks, which then results in
human contact with bird blood and body
fluids. It is common practice for people in
rural areas to live in close proximity with
their domestic animals, often times shar-
ing room in the home or nearby. It is a
typical scene to see cattle, ducks, chick-
ens, and pigs living in or very near a fam-
ily dwelling. The methods in which ducks
are raised can include providing access to
recently harvested rice paddies, where
mixing with wild birds is commonplace.
The aquatic environment is an excellent
media for the persistence of viable avian
influenza virus.
The trade in wild animals is a multi-
billion dollar global operation. The ani-
mal markets or “wet markets” of Asia are
a mixing bowl of domestic animals,
wildlife from near and far, and people.
Most often, sanitation and hygiene are
very poor to nonexistent, and both people
and animals are under a tremendous
amount of stress, lowering immuno-com-
petency. Those in the marketplace are
handling live birds and butchering others
without any personal protection and often
live, eat, and sleep in their shops amongst
their animals for sale. This serves as an
excellent environment in which pathogens
can mutate and jump into novel species.
While it is uncertain that civet cats were
the source of severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS) in the Guangdong markets
of China, it is clear they carried the dis-
ease. Since initial findings implicated
civet cats, other species, such as domestic
cats and fruit bats, have been shown to
harbor the virus.
The FVPhas been performing surveil-
lance of wild bird populations for some 15
years in selected landscapes around the
globe. Our work has demonstrated low
pathogenic strains of avian influenza as far
south as the Falkland Islands. In August
2005, a multi-disciplinary team comprised
of FVP field veterinarians and Mongolian
scientists performed field surveillance
research in nine different sites along the
migratory waterfowl flyway in Mongolia,
including Erhel Lake, where a bird die-off
was reported. At these nine sites, 850
fecal samples were collected, including
433 samples at Erhel Lake. All birds sam-
pled were identified as to species and this
information recorded. All species at a
given location were identified and individ-
uals counted so prevalence rates could be
calculated. No virus was detected in live
bird fecal culture samples. Six dead birds
were necropsied. HPAI H5N1 was isolat-
ed from a whooper swan on Erhel Lake.
The organism was isolated from samples
provided to the United States Department
of Agriculture ARS Poultry Laboratory in
Athens, Georgia. The H5N1 isolate was
determined to be a Clade II strain and
selected by the World Health Organization
and Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention to be included in the research
efforts to produce a human vaccine.
The results of this work suggest that
the HPAI H5N1 has entered the migratory
waterfowl flyway. The fact that the vast
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majority of birds appeared healthy and
their fecal cultures were negative also sug-
gests that the prevalence of virus is low.
Further, the observation that sick birds
died and one of these few animals had
H5N1 raises the question as to whether the
migratory birds in this surveillance project
were highly competent carriers of the
organism. Further work must be per-
formed to determine if there is a species of
wild bird that can carry the disease for
long distances. If wild birds prove to die
precipitously from the disease, then
wildlife birds are not likely the source of
spread for HPAI H5N1, but rather one
must consider other sources for spread into
domestic poultry populations. These
sources could easily be domestic poultry
or the vast number of animals moving
through the trade in domestic animals and
wildlife for meat and pets that are being
placed into markets in distant and dis-
parate sites. The most effective method of
protecting people from contracting HPAI
H5N1 is to educate them on proper sanita-
tion and hygiene for themselves and their
domestic poultry. Basic preventive meth-
ods such as hand washing and proper pro-
tective garb when handling poultry will
greatly reduce the risk of spread to humans
from animals. Killing wild birds will be
an unsuccessful mitigation method. It will
not halt the spread of this disease in
domestic poultry and subsequently into
those that are in close proximity to these
animals.
It is most important to note that H5N1
is but one of many possible strains of
avian influenza that might someday
become a competent pathogen of people.
In addition, avian influenza is but one of a
plethora of diseases that might make the
evolutionary jump from being an animal
pathogen to becoming a human disease.
We must begin to think more holistically
about our approach to the health of people
and animals. We must consider that all
living things on this world are intimately
linked and only by understanding the rela-
tionships can we begin to provide sound
solutions to complex disease threats.
Halting the trade in wildlife is a critically
important step to lowering the risk of
pathogens emerging from wildlife to
domestic animals and people and will slow
the loss of biodiversity on our planet.
ONE WORLD, ONE HEALTH
In recent years, outbreaks of diseases
such as avian flu, severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS), the Ebola virus, and
mad cow disease have frightened the pub-
lic, disrupted global commerce, caused
massive economic losses, and jeopardized
diplomatic relations. These diseases have
also shared a worrisome key characteris-
tic: The ability to cross the Darwinian
divide between animals and people. None
of these illnesses depends on human hosts
for its survival; as a result, they all persist
today, far beyond the reach of medical
intervention.
Meanwhile, humanity has become
vulnerable to cross-species illnesses,
thanks to modern advances such as the
rapid transportation of both goods and
people, increasing population density
around the globe, and a growing depen-
dence on intensified livestock production
for food. The global transport of animals
and animal products, which includes hun-
dreds of species of wildlife, also provides
safe passage for the harmful bacteria,
viruses, and fungi they carry, not to men-
tion the prion proteins that cause insidious
illnesses such as mad cow disease and
chronic wasting disease in deer and elk.
Adding to the risks is the fact that
while many people in the developed world
would scarcely recognize meat if it did not
come wrapped in clear plastic, the vast
majority of people on the planet today still
slaughter animals for meat themselves or
buy it fresh, salted, or smoked in open-air
markets. These markets generally go unin-
spected by health officials, and consumers
rarely have access to good health care,education on hygiene, common vaccines,
or antibiotics.
Not only is local and national health
care often a problem, internationally no
agency is responsible for, or capable of,
monitoring and preventing the myriad dis-
eases that can now cross the borders
between countries and species. More
specifically, no organization has the man-
date to pursue policies based on a simple
but critically important concept: That the
health of people, animals, and the environ-
ment in which we all live are inextricably
linked.
Thus, for example, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture works to pro-
tect only the United States livestock indus-
try and has scaled back the attention it
pays to animals outside the United States
over the last two decades. Despite new
concerns about terrorist attacks on the U.S.
food supply, Washington has still made lit-
tle attempt to research and reduce diseases
overseas before they reach U.S. shores.
Nor does the United Nations direct the
resources necessary to do a better job. The
U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization,
for example, is mandated to monitor the
production of livestock and crops but does
little to track threats to and dangers from
wild plants and animals. The World
Animal Health Organization has a volun-
teer committee that considers wildlife-
related diseases, but it consists of just six
people and meets only three days a year.
And the World Health Organization
(WHO) can only get involved in a country
if officially invited, leaving it helpless to
intervene in countries with governments
that either do not know about or do not
want to reveal the presence of a disease
within their borders. The U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
must similarly wait for an invitation before
extending its reach outside the United
States.
What all this means is that no govern-
ment agency or multilateral organization
today focuses on the numerous diseases
that threaten people, domestic animals,
and wildlife alike. Nor does any one body
collect and collate data from across the
scientific spectrum to ensure that health
solutions are based on the input of profes-
sionals from all the various health fields
working with humans, domestic animals,
and wildlife.
Yet diseases pay no regard to the divi-
sions among species or academic disci-
plines, and the failure to recognize this
truth is placing humanity in great peril. As
a recent outbreak of avian influenza
reminded the world, what happens in one
part of it — and to one species — can have
a deadly serious impact on others. The
planet clearly needs a new health para-
digm that not only integrates the efforts of
disparate groups but also balances their
respective influences to help bridge the
gaps between them. This is especially so
since the immediate effects of a particular
illness are often the least of the problem.
Diseases that attack people and animals
also cause poverty and civil unrest, disrupt
“free” ecosystem services such as drinking
water and plant pollination, and threaten
otherwise well-planned and sustainable
economic development efforts, such as
low-impact tourism. In short, the failure to
adopt a planetwide and cross-species
approach to health is getting costlier by the
day; humanity cannot afford to pay the
price much longer.
THE WORLD WE WERE GIVEN
According to recent analysis, more
than 60 percent of the 1,415 infectious dis-
eases currently known to modern medi-
cine are capable of infecting both animals
and humans. Most of these diseases (such
as anthrax, Rift Valley fever, bubonic
plague, Lyme disease, and monkeypox)
are “zoonotic,” meaning they originated in
animals but have crossed the species barri-
er to infect people. The others, which
receive less attention, are “anthropo-
zoonotic,” meaning they are typically
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found in humans but can and do infect ani-
mals as well (examples include the human
herpes virus, tuberculosis, and measles).
Dividing infectious agents into these two
groups is convenient for teaching purpos-
es. But it overlooks the critically important
fact that all of them can move back and
forth among species, mutating and chang-
ing their characteristics in the process.
Avian influenza — which started in birds
but is now infecting humans as well — has
recently highlighted the need for a more
holistic view of disease.
It is probably just luck that has so far
allowed scientists to maintain these dis-
tinctions. One of the greatest medical suc-
cess stories of the last century was the
eradication of smallpox. But this achieve-
ment was largely due to the fact that small-
pox survives in only one host species,
namely humans. If even one more type of
animal had been able to harbor the disease,
there is a good chance that eradication
would not have been accomplished,
despite the Herculean global effort. When
a pathogen can find refuge or a place to
mutate in a range of hosts, controlling it
becomes far more complex, requiring an
integrated — and much more difficult —
approach.
To get a sense of the breadth and the
seriousness of the issue, consider
HIV/AIDS, which most scientists now
think arose in Africa as a result of the
human consumption of primates that were
infected with simian immunodeficiency
viruses. Or consider the Ebola virus,
which has a similar history. The disease
first came to international attention in
1976, when it appeared around the Ebola
River in what was then called Zaire. The
virus infects people, gorillas, chim-
panzees, and monkeys, causing severe
internal and external hemorrhaging and
leading to death in up to 90 percent of its
human victims. Human infection spreads
quickly, especially via caregivers and peo-
ple who flee an area to escape the illness.
Since the disease first appeared, succes-
sive human outbreaks have been recorded
in Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Sudan, and
Uganda. But humans have not been the
only victims; lowland gorillas and chim-
panzees in Gabon and Congo and chim-
panzees in western equatorial Africa have
been decimated by the sickness. Other for-
est animals, such as duikers (small
antelopes) and bush pigs may also be
affected. When subsistence hunters dis-
cover a sick or dead animal in the forest,
they view it as good fortune and bring it
home to feed their families or trade with
their neighbors. The Ebola virus then eas-
ily infects those handling the meat, and a
chain of contacts and infections ensue.
Each of the human outbreaks in central
Africa during the late 1990s and the first
years of this century was traced to humans
handling infected great apes.
SARS also arose from contact with
wild animals. The illness first appeared in
late 2002 in China's Guangdong Province,
where people began complaining of high
fever, cough, and diarrhea, and eventually
developed severe pneumonia. The
unknown disease was very contagious;
within a matter of weeks, a visitor to Hong
Kong helped spread it to five continents.
By July 2003, the WHO had tallied 8,437
cases and 813 deaths. Due mostly to a lack
of understanding of the new disease, glob-
al travel and trade were disrupted as fear
spread.
After four months, scientists eventu-
ally discovered that the mystery disease
was caused by a coronavirus (a family of
viruses found in many animal species).
The virus, in turn, was traced back to a
small mammal called the palm civet,
which is farmed in the Guangdong region
and sold for human consumption. Later,
evidence of the virus was also found in
raccoon dogs, ferrets, and badgers being
sold in Guangdong's wildlife markets, as
well as in domestic cats living in the city.
Epidemiological studies confirmed that
the first human infections had indeed
come through animal contact, although theexact species responsible has not been
definitively identified.
In the months after SARS first
appeared, the Chinese government closed
down its live wildlife markets. Within 10
days of linking the disease to the wild ani-
mal trade, the government also confiscated
close to a million animals, many of which
had been brought into the area from other
parts of the world and which hosted a vari-
ety of exotic viruses and bacteria. But the
damage had already been done. Prior to
the government action, the animals were
often housed together, exposed to one
another’s waste, and sometimes even fed
to one another. For a virus or bacteria
capable of jumping between species, the
markets had provided the perfect place to
reproduce.
THE WORLD'S NOT FLAT, IT'S A
MIXING BOWL
China, however, is far from the only
country where people risk infection from
animal-borne diseases. The West is also in
danger, as was discovered in late May
2003, when the first cases of a mysterious
illness were reported in hospitals in
Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin. Patients,
many of whom had been in close contact
with pet prairie dogs, started coming down
with skin ulcers and fevers. It was soon
discovered that a prairie dog dealer in
Wisconsin had let a number of his animals
mix with rodents recently imported from
Ghana that happened to be carrying the
monkeypox virus. An animal distributor
had then sold the infected prairie dogs to
pet stores in Milwaukee and at an animal
swap meet in northern Wisconsin. Within
about a month, 71 human cases of mon-
keypox in six Midwestern states had been
reported to the CDC; luckily, no one died.
It remains unknown how or where
waste from the infected prairie dogs was
dumped or whether owners released any
infected prairie dogs into the wild during
the scare. Moreover, U.S. laws remain
dangerously lax. At the time of the mon-
keypox outbreak, it was legal to import
any nonendangeredAfrican rodent into the
United States as a pet — despite the fact
that the risk of bringing in foreign diseases
in the process was predictable and could
have been avoided through international
surveillance and information-sharing pro-
grams. (Wildlife health experts and human
health workers in central Africa have long
associated human monkeypox infections
with rodent and squirrel contact.) Since
the U.S. outbreak, Washington has
imposed restrictions on the import of
African rodents, but it remains legal to
bring in rodents from other continents, and
many other species from around the world
continue to be shipped into the United
States and many other countries, largely
without oversight.
Determining the exact scale of the
global wildlife trade is impossible, since
the operations range from the extremely
local to the international, and are often
illegal and informal. Part of the picture,
however, can be glimpsed from figures
compiled by the Wildlife Conservation
Society from a variety of sources.
According to these numbers, the annual
global trade in live wild animals includes
roughly 4 million birds, 640,000 reptiles,
and 40,000 primates. Following the SARS
outbreak that began in 2002, the Chinese
government reportedly confiscated
838,500 wild animals from the markets of
Guangdong. But every year, tens of mil-
lions of wild mammals, birds, and reptiles
continue to flow through these and other
trading centers, where they make contact
with humans and dozens of other species
before being shipped elsewhere, sold
locally, or sometimes freed back into the
wild — often carrying new and dangerous
pathogens. The number of these animals
that end up as food is staggering; indeed,
experts estimate that in central Africa
alone, consumers eat 579 million individ-
ual wild animals a year, for a total of more
than a billion kilograms of meat.
344 Cook: Emerging Diseases; the role of wildlifeCook: Emerging Diseases; the role of wildlife 345
Meanwhile, people in the Amazon basin
are thought to consume between 67 and
164 million kilograms of wild animal meat
a year, accounting for between 6.4 million
and 15.8 million individual mammals
alone.
Before these animals (with whatever
diseases they may be carrying) are eaten,
they encounter — and possibly transmit
pathogens to — hunters and marketers.
They also risk infecting domestic animals
and wild scavengers in villages and market
areas that consume the remnants and waste
of wildlife eaten by humans. All consid-
ered, at least a billion direct and indirect
contacts among wildlife, humans, and
domestic animals result from the handling
of wildlife and the wildlife trade annually.
Such contact does not just endanger
humans and their pets; the pathogens inad-
vertently transported around the globe can
also devastate local wildlife, disrupting the
environment and causing enormous eco-
nomic harm. In October 2004, avian flu
(specifically, the H5N1 type A influenza
virus) was detected in two mountain
hawk-eagles that were smuggled from
Thailand into Belgium in airline carry-on
baggage. Last year, another deadly virus
entered Italy via a shipment of Pakistani
parrots, lovebirds, and finches.
Chytridiomycosis, a fungal disease
responsible for the extinction of 30 percent
of the world’s amphibian species, has been
spread by the international trade and sub-
sequent release of African clawed frogs (a
popular laboratory animal). Tuberculosis
originating from domestic cattle has now
infected herds of wild bison in Canada,
deer in Michigan, and cape buffalo and
lions in South Africa. In 1999, rinderpest,
a disease originally introduced to Africa
by the importation of domestic cattle from
India, killed more wild buffalo in Kenya
than had been slain by poachers during the
previous two decades.
The increasing movement of animals
and humans around the world and their
greater exposure to the many diseases that
dance between them have also placed
domesticated livestock at increasing risk.
This is especially so since the ravenous
international demand for animal meat has
turned livestock production into an
ultraintensive industry, with swine, poul-
try, and cattle operations now packing
huge numbers of animals into limited
spaces. Moreover, projections by the
International Food Policy Research
Institute indicate a doubling of animal pro-
duction in developing countries over the
next 20 years. Although modern factory-
farm practices maximize food production,
they also make livestock more susceptible
to illness. Infection spreads quickly
through crowded animal pens, and grow-
ing antibiotic resistance makes fighting
disease more difficult. Many farms now
routinely mix antibiotics with animal feed
to avoid transmitting illnesses, and selec-
tive breeding for specific traits often pre-
disposes animals to conditions requiring
repeated antibiotic treatment. Such
increased antibiotic use is helping to create
dangerous drug-resistant superbugs that
may endanger both animals and humans.
High-volume food production has
also prompted the livestock industry to
adopt other dangerous practices, which
have already led to at least one high-pro-
file disaster: the outbreak of bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), or
mad cow disease, in the United Kingdom.
Mad cow disease is a chronic, degenera-
tive disorder that affects the central ner-
vous system of cattle. The disease, known
as scrapie in sheep, had existed for hun-
dreds of years without infecting other
species. It only crossed over to cattle when
British farmers started feeding infected
sheep byproducts to their herds in the
1980s. Once BSE jumped to cows, it start-
ed spreading rapidly, with 182,745 docu-
mented cases occurring between 1986 and
2002 in the United Kingdom. In response
to the outbreak, European countries
banned all imports of British cattle. But
BSE has nonetheless been found inEurope, Canada, and the United States
since then. It has also jumped to people,
and a new human variant of the illness,
known as Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, is
believed to be responsible for 150 deaths
since 1995.
Malaysia has also fallen victim to a
disease spread by new farming techniques.
The Nipah virus appeared in the country’s
pig and human populations in 1998, killing
105 people and forcing the Malaysian gov-
ernment to cull more than 1 million pigs to
stop the spread. Five species of fruit bats
were also found to carry the virus, suggest-
ing a wide prevalence of the pathogen
among healthy bats. It seems that people
acquired the virus from handling infected
pigs, which contracted the disease from
bats feeding in fruit trees standing in newly
developed pig farms.
The Nipah outbreak highlights what
can happen when people and domestic ani-
mals modify previously undisturbed wild
habitats. Within natural ecosystems,
microbes and wildlife tend to exist more or
less in balance. But the introduction of new
species — such as cows, pigs, dogs, or
humans — can allow pathogens to jump
into these new hosts, which may have no
natural immunity or evolved resistance.
The results, predictably, can be devastating.
In addition to the direct health dam-
age they have caused people and animals,
animal-related pathogens have destabi-
lized international trade and caused hun-
dreds of billions of dollars of economic
damage globally. The report of the U.S.
National Intelligence Council’s 2020
Project, “Mapping the Global Future,” has
identified a global pandemic as the single
most important threat to the global econo-
my. In early 2003, the U.N. Food and
Agriculture Organization reported that
more than one-third of the global meat
trade was being embargoed as a result of
mad cow disease, avian influenza, and
other livestock illnesses. According to Bio
Economic ResearchAssociates, the rash of
emerging or re-emerging livestock dis-
eases that have cropped up around the
world since the mid-1990s (illnesses that
include mad cow disease, foot-and-mouth
disease, avian influenza, swine fever, and
others) has caused losses of an estimated
$100 billion; SARS alone cost the global
economy half that amount. The pain
caused by such crises, moreover, has
spread far beyond those responsible;
wildlife market traders were not the ones
who paid for the SARS outbreak, and the
African rodent importer in Texas did not
reimburse the United States and local gov-
ernments for the millions of dollars spent
to contain monkeypox in 2003.
Nor can these dollar figures adequate-
ly reflect the often devastating effect out-
breaks can have on some of the poorest
people on the planet. Since 2003, for
example, efforts to control the spread of
avian influenza in Asia have required the
culling of more than 140 million chickens.
In countries such as Thailand and
Vietnam, the vast majority of these ani-
mals were not owned by large, industrial
producers, but by small farmers and peas-
ants. Losing their livestock was painful
indeed, especially since financial compen-
sation schemes for rural poultry owners
are rare to nonexistent in much of
Southeast Asia. Not only did this lack of
compensation increase the damage done
by the disease; it also created a serious dis-
incentive for bird owners to report suspi-
cious illnesses among their flocks.
RISING TO THE OCCASION
As many of these examples suggest,
preventing or controlling future outbreaks
of animal-borne diseases and mitigating
their impact will require a far broader
approach than has so far been attempted
by the generally isolated health systems of
highly developed countries. Too often, the
global response to new pathogens has been
driven by fear, which has only magnified
the economic and other costs of disease
control.
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That said, a few brave individuals
have already begun the process of creating
a new international and interdisciplinary
approach to disease control. Working in
some of the most remote places on earth,
they have slowly established knowledge-
sharing networks, such as the World
Conservation Union's Veterinary
Specialist Group. And their contributions
have already been significant. For exam-
ple, when avian influenza first appeared,
much attention was mistakenly directed at
controlling its spread among wild birds in
Northeast and SoutheastAsia. It was these
new informal participants in health discus-
sions — such as conservation biologists
and veterinarians working with the
Wildlife Conservation Society in
Cambodia and linked to staff at the Food
andAgriculture Organization — who were
the first to point out that the migratory
routes and timing of wild birds did not
actually correspond with the spread of the
disease and that domestic birds were more
likely the culprit. Without this insight,
valuable resources would have been wast-
ed trying to control the disease among the
wrong animal population.
As important as such contributions
have been, however, many individuals try-
ing to develop a new global approach to
health-care work for nongovernmental
organizations or for local governments lack
the resources and a larger, formal network
that could fill in the gaps in health care as
it relates to wildlife and humanity. Were
their resources improved, the results would
be enormously beneficial; building bridges
across disciplines to solve health problems
can have simple but profound effects.
For example, studies in South
America have shown that contrary to com-
mon opinion, livestock diseases pose
many more threats to wildlife than the
other way around. In much of the world,
reducing disease in domestic animals
would benefit several industries, improve
human health and livelihoods, and help
safeguard wild animals. As this suggests,
strategically increasing protections in one
area of health care can benefit another. For
example, gorillas and chimpanzees in cen-
tral Africa have little to no immunity to
common human diseases, and so they are
endangered by contact with local people
and tourists. This risk could be dramatical-
ly reduced by implementing good preven-
tive health programs and practices in local
villages, which would benefit both people
and wildlife.Already, work with the Ebola
virus in gorillas and chimpanzees has
shown that investments in wildlife health
can protect urban human populations; in
Africa, animal health workers detected the
presence of Ebola in wildlife months
before the first human cases occurred, pro-
viding critical lead-time to warn villagers
not to hunt or handle the animals that were
a source of the infection. Such a broad,
“one health” approach to disease can be
much more effective and inexpensive than
the traditional “quarantine and stamping
out” strategy for fighting an illness after an
outbreak has already begun. Specialists in
human and animal health, in conjunction
with wildlife conservation professionals,
have already developed a set of guiding
concepts on these themes, called the
Manhattan Principles. But the ideas still
need much broader acceptance to be more
effective.
To further improve the chances of
heading off and limiting the effect of ani-
mal-related diseases, a number of addition-
al steps are necessary. To begin with, better
worldwide surveillance to detect infectious
diseases among wildlife is needed to
improve response time and reduce the costs
of new outbreaks. Such surveillance differs
from traditional hypothesis-driven disease
research because it involves very broad
searching rather than attempts to answer a
highly focused question. Investment in
gathering advance information can pay off
handsomely; early warning of how diseases
work and of their normal characteristics
among animals can help limit the damage
when the illnesses start to spread.New public-private partnerships
could also be hugely helpful. Currently,
the failure of public-sector programs to
comprehensively monitor, prevent, and
respond to unusual diseases is being com-
pensated for by the private sector.
Coordination between these efforts and
governments remains limited — in some
cases due to regulations and restrictions
that prevent such collaboration. For exam-
ple, under its agreement with member
states, the World Animal Health
Organization cannot accept information on
wildlife diseases in a country unless that
information has been submitted officially
by a national agricultural authority — few
of which are mandated or organized to
monitor wildlife diseases. These policies
should be reformulated to facilitate coop-
eration among governments, corporations,
and nonprofit organizations, and formal
mechanisms for sharing information
should be established.
It would also help to shift responsibil-
ity for the costs of outbreak prevention and
control to animal traders, since this would
provide them with incentives for reducing
disease and would lower the costs of dis-
ease surveillance, control, and prevention
by third parties. One way to force traders
to shoulder more of the costs would be to
require them to buy disease outbreak
insurance on all animal imports or ship-
ments. Doing so would discourage danger-
ous activities among animal traders by hit-
ting them where it hurts: in their wallets.
Financial incentives are not enough,
however;theWorldTradeOrganizationand
other appropriate international bodies must
also start requiring governments to better
regulate the health aspects of international
trade in wild and domestic animals.
Individual states also need to implement
new laws to prevent the spread of diseases
within their borders. There is now plenty of
evidence to suggest that human trade and
consumption of wildlife have led to global
health disasters; governments must there-
fore immediately start making serious
efforts both to reduce and to regulate prop-
erly the trade of such animals international-
ly, regionally, and even locally.
On the health-care side, decisions still
tend to be made without sufficient input
from all appropriate stakeholders. For
example, the decision of a SoutheastAsian
government in 2004 to control avian
influenza by culling wild migratory birds
failed to identify the real source of the
problem (domestic livestock) or to recog-
nize that the wild birds were protected by
at least two separate international conven-
tions. Involving experts in public health,
agriculture, and environmental conserva-
tion, as well as legal counsel, in such deci-
sions would help governments avoid
repeating these mistakes and adopt more
sound strategies in the future.
Finally, greater bilateral and multilat-
eral aid is needed for efforts to gather,
evaluate, and share information on infec-
tious diseases that affect the wide range of
living organisms present around the world.
Too often, health experts focus on human
health and agriculture alone, missing a
huge part of the picture. More money must
be spent on initiatives that include wildlife
health and conservation in discussions of
human health care; more money would
also help stimulate the development of
holistic efforts in areas of the world where
they are most critically needed.
The obstacles to identifying, under-
standing, and sharing information about
all infectious diseases on the planet may
appear daunting. But they are no excuse
for not trying. New, holistic approaches
should be started at local and regional lev-
els; such efforts are already proving effi-
cient and cost-effective and are advertising
the benefits of the new paradigm. Such
small- and medium-scale efforts can be
built up over time and run in parallel with
higher-order, global coordination.
The time to launch such initiatives is
now, before the next global pandemic
occurs. Bridges must be built between dif-
ferent scientific disciplines, and trade in
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wildlife must be dramatically reduced and,
like the livestock industry, properly regu-
lated. Global health will not be achieved
without a philosophical shift from the
expert-controlled, top-down paradigm that
still dominates both science and medicine.
A broader, more democratic approach is
needed, one based on the understanding
that there is only one world — and only
one health.
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